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Abstract
I study the self-selection of motivated teachers between public and private schools in a
mixed duopoly environment. The quality is influenced by the effort exerted by the teachers.
Teachers’ motivation may have a positive impact on the levels of effort and, then, on the
quality. The effect of motivation strictly depends on the degree of differentiation of the
programs offered by the two schools. When both schools offer similar programs, the Nash
equilibrium is the one in which both schools hire motivated teachers. This is because
teachers’ motivation plays an important role in the students’ choice between the two schools.
In contrast, when the two schools offer significantly different programs, the Nash equilibrium
is the one in which both schools hire selfish teachers. Hiring motivated teachers would hurt
schools’ profits and benefit students. However, the former effect dominates the latter.
Keywords: Intrinsic Motivation, Mixed Duopoly, School Choice, Hotelling Model.
JEL classifications: D03, D21, L13.
1 Introduction
It is often argued that preferences and work motivation of employees differ depending on
the nature of the jobs. Many jobs involve helping people in need or contributing to the
society at large, making these jobs attractive to people who have a strong willingness to
serve the others or the public interest (see Buurman, Dur and Van den Bossche, 2009).
In this paper I focus on the example of teaching. Teachers can take satisfaction from
teaching and from developing strategies that are consistent with the best interest of the
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students because they believe in the virtue of the education for the society. When this is
the case, teachers are intrinsically motivated.1
There is a positive relationship between teachers’ motivation and the quality of educa-
tion. This is because the cost of eliciting a given amount of effort from a motivated teacher
is lower. Therefore, when teachers are motivated the quality of education is higher. As
teachers may be given different incentives to provide effort, there exists some degree of
vertical differentiation between schools. Parents’ school choice depends on the differences
in the quality of the education. A high level of quality may play a crucial role in the par-
ents’ decision between different schools. However, it is not the only variable that parents
take into account when making the schools’ choice.
Different schools may charge different tuition fees and offer heterogeneous educational
services. This is particularly true if one considers the educational services provided by
public and private institutions. In Italy, for example, most private schools have a strong
religious connotation2 while public schools are typically secular. Furthermore, there is a
number of foreign and international schools that are private, including American, French
and British schools. Many international schools offer bi-lingual programs, as well as En-
glish as a Foreign Language (EFL) exams if the students’ first language is not English.
Then, private schools can be appealing to parents who want to give their children an
education closer to the international standards. On top of that, most private schools can
offer a more caring and protective atmosphere, as well as the opportunity of additional
or intensive lessons, which some parents believe to be more conducive to learning. Par-
ents in some of the wealthier areas of the major cities may also send their children to
a private school simply for its exclusivity. Thus, there exists some degree of horizontal
differentiation which impacts on the parents’ school choice.
This article analyzes the “market” for education by developing a model that focuses
on the interaction between the public and private educational sectors.3 More specifically,
I investigate the impact of teachers’ intrinsic motivation on the schools’ outcome in terms
of quality, price and wage in a mixed duopoly environment (see De Fraja and Delbono,
1990, and Nett, 1993, for general reviews of the mixed oligopoly markets).4 To this end, I
1Another suitable example could be the health-care system. Doctors may be interested not only in
their monetary compensation but also in the impact of their work on the well-being of their patients (see
for example Ma, 2004).
2Most private schools are run by religious organizations (the majority by the Jesuits).
3Epple and Romano (1998) also study a model of competition between public and private schools.
However, their model stresses competition for students among public and private schools.
4The issue of competition between schools has been examined by a number of authors under different
assumptions pertaining the objective functions of schools and education outcomes (see for example De
Fraia and Iossa, 2002, Maldonado, 2008, and De Fraja and Valbonesi, 2012). However, these papers
study the impact of competition on the education outcomes when the schools’ objective functions are
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develop an oligopolistic model where two schools are positioned at each end of a Hotelling
line. The horizontal differentiation reflects the heterogeneity of the programs offered by
the schools. While the private school maximizes its profits, the public school maximizes
social welfare. The social welfare is given by the sum of the students’ utility, the teachers’
utility and the profits obtained by both schools. Each school consists of a principal and
an agent, both risk neutral. The principal-agent relationship can be interpreted as the
relationship between the school-principal who needs a teacher (the agent) to provide the
educational service. The two schools offer imperfectly substitutable programs and they
compete against each other on quality and prices. When the degree of substitutability is
high, it means that the schools offer similar programs and there is more competition in
the market.
The school principals non-cooperatively decide whether to hire motivated or non mo-
tivated teachers. I show that the presence of motivated teachers can benefit or hurt public
and private schools depending on the degree of differentiation between the programs of-
fered by the two schools. If the programs offered by the schools are only slightly different
and both principals hire self-interested teachers, a principal finds it profitable to devi-
ate by hiring a motivated teacher. By doing so, the public principal increases the social
welfare and the private principal obtains a comparative advantage in terms of demand
and price. Then, if a principal hires a motivated teacher the best response of the other
principal is to hire a motivated teacher as well. The Nash equilibrium is the one in which
both schools hire motivated teachers. Teachers’ motivation plays an important role in
the students’ choice between the two schools. Individuals’ intrinsic motivation increases
the quality of the educational services offered by both schools. To elicit higher levels of
effort to increase quality, both principals have to offer higher incentives to their teachers.
Then, motivation has a positive impact on the wages offered to the teachers. This result
stands in contrast to the previous literature on psychological incentives in organizations
in which motivation is effective in stimulating work effort even in absence of monetary
rewards (see for example Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b and Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003,
2006).5
If the schools offer very different programs, there is less scope for quality-competition
in the market and the teachers’ intrinsic motivation becomes relatively less important.
homogeneous.
5This literature shows that monetary incentives can influence negatively the individuals’ behavior in
terms of their levels of contribution. The reason is that monetary incentives give the agent a selfish
motive to operate. Explicit incentives from principals may change how tasks are perceived by agents
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a) and they may also reduce the value of generous or civic minded acts as
a signal of one’s moral character (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006). If extrinsic incentives are not large
enough, this change in perception can even lead to undesired effects on behavior (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000b).
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In that case, hiring motivated teachers would hurt schools’ profits and benefit students.
However, the former effect dominates the latter. Then, the Nash equilibrium is the one
in which both schools hire selfish teachers and students will choose the school with a
program closer to their necessity.
This article is related to two strands of the literature: the literature on “mixed
oligopolies” and the literature on psychological incentives in organizations. The former
focuses on the competition among institutions with different objective functions (see for
example Cremer et al., 1991, Grilo, 1994, and Delbono et al., 1996)6 without considering
potential differences in the agents’ preferences. In this literature, some articles study
the issue of competition in education markets when education providers can be public
and private (see for example Cellini and Goldini, 2012, Deming et al., 2012, and Cremer
and Maldonado, 2013).7 The latter focuses on the impact of monetary incentives on the
level of effort exerted by motivated agents (see for instance Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003,
2006; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b). In this literature, some articles also study
the matching of motivated employees between public and private sector (see for exam-
ple Besley and Ghatak, 2005, and Prendergast, 2007). My objective is to bridge these
two strands of the literature considering the interaction between intrinsic motivation and
monetary incentives in a mixed duopoly environment.
The reminder of the article is as follows: in section 2 I present the set-up of the model;
in section 3 I characterize the equilibrium of the model; in section 4 I study the solution
of the game; and concluding remarks are given in section 5.
2 The Set-Up of the Model
I build a mixed duopoly model where two schools are positioned at each end of a Hotelling
line, with locations xi = 0 and xj = 1, respectively. The school i is public and the school
j is private. The public school maximizes the social welfare. In contrast, the private
school maximizes his profits. Each school is constituted of a principal and an agent,
both of whom are risk neutral. The principal-agent relationship can be interpreted as the
relationship between the school-principal that delegates the decision about an outcome
in terms of quality q to an agent (the teacher). A teacher working in the public sector
6Cremer et al. (1991) study price competition in a market represented by a Hotelling (1929) line in
which private and public firms choose first locations and then prices. Then, Grilo (1994) study a mixed
competition model in which products are vertically differentiated and firms non-cooperatively choose first
qualities and then prices. Finally, Delbono et al. (1996), using a model similar to Grilo (1994), introduce
the possibility that the market might be uncovered.
7Cellini and Goldini (2012) and Deming et al. (2012) empirically show that US education markets are
effectively mixed. Cremer and Maldonado (2013) study a mixed duopoly model in which the quality of
education depends on “peer group” effects.
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cannot participate in the private sector too, and viceversa. There are a continuum of
students of mass 1 distributed uniformly along the line.
The agents are wealth constrained with zero initial wealth and have a reservation wage
of zero. The agents have quadratic effort costs, which are observable to the principal.
The exerted effort ǫ determines the quality of the educational services offered by the two
schools. For expositional convenience, I assume that quality q depends linearly on the
teachers’ effort: q = ǫ in both schools. There is no asymmetric information between the
principal and the agent. Since quality is verifiable, the principals do not need to offer an
incentive to the agents because they have all the necessary information to implement the
efficient levels of quality.
In addition, the teachers’ utilities might positively depend on the benefits of the stu-
dents. The teachers can be also interested in the impact of their work on the students’
utility. The measure of this utility depends on the parameter θ that represents the intrin-
sic motivation of the agent. It influences the optimal levels of quality and price. There
are only two types of teachers: the self-interested teachers with θ = 0 and the motivated
teachers with θ > 0. There is an infinite number of teachers of both types. The prin-
cipals offer a wage that covers the cost of effort paid by the teacher minus his intrinsic
motivation.
After the employment decision, the two schools offer imperfectly substitutable services,
competing against each other on quality q and prices p.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the initial stage 0, each principal decides
whether to hire a motivated teacher or a non motivated teacher. At stage 1, each principal
makes an offer (ω, q) to their agent. The teachers accept any contract with an expected
utility of at least their reservation utility, which I normalize to 0. If the agents accept
the contract, they exert the required levels of effort; At stage 2, after agents have exerted
effort determined by the contract, principals simultaneously choose prices; At stage 3, the
students choose between the two school.
2.1 The Objective Functions
A student enjoys a utility
Ui = qi − pi − tx from the service offered by the public school i and
Uj = qj − pj − t(1− x) from the service offered by the private school j.
(1)
At location x, a student i incurs a transport cost tx for traveling to school i and a cost
t(1− x) to school j. For given pi, pj, qi, qj there is a cutoff x, such that all students with
x < x choose the service of school i, and with x > x choose school j. The parameter
t represents the degree of differentiation of the educational services offered by the two
schools. When t is low the schools offer similar programs, implying fierce competition.
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The key assumption of this model is that teachers can be intrinsically motivated. The
teachers’ utility function consists of their own “egoistic” payoff, given by the difference
between wage and effort costs, and of their intrinsic motivation. There are two types of
teachers: self-interested teachers with θ = 0 and motivated teachers with θ > 0.
The agents’ utility function from working in the public and private schools, respec-
tively, can be written as:
Vi = ωi −
1
2
q2i + θiU i
Vj = ωj −
1
2
q2j + θjU j
(2)
where U i and U j are the utilities of the average student deciding for school i and school
j, respectively, and are equal to: U i = qi − pi − t
x
2
and U j = qj − pj − t
(1−x)
2
.
The public school i maximizes the social welfare while the private school j maximizes
profits. The social welfare is given by the sum of the students’ average utility, the teachers’
utility and the profits obtained by the schools. More specifically, the public school i
maximizes the following:
πi = U i + U j + Vi + Vj + pi di − ωi + pj dj − ωj. (3)
While the private school j maximizes the following profit function:
πj = pj dj − ωj + v, (4)
where v is strictly positive and represents the funding offered to the private school.8
The principals maximize their objective functions under the following participation
constraints:
ωi −
1
2
q2i − θi U i ≥ 0;
ωj −
1
2
q2j − θj U j ≥ 0.
(5)
The participation constraints guarantee that both teachers do not choose their outside
option.
I make the following assumption to guarantee an interior solution.
Assumption 1. I restrict the attention to the case in which the parameters lie in the
following intervals.
 t ∈
(
0, 1
3
)
;
 and θ ∈
(
0, 1−3t
2(1+t)
]
.
The role of this assumption will become clear in the next sections.
8Most private schools in Italy are either authorized or given legal recognition by the state and many
receive state funding.
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3 The Characterization of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium is determined by backward induction.
At stage 3, the students choose the school. A student located at x is indifferent
between the public school i and the private school j if and only if Ui = Uj , or equivalently
qi − pi − tx = qj − pj − t(1 − x). x represents the demand for the public school i and
(1− x) the demand for the private school j:
x = di(qi, qj, pi, pj, t) =
1
2
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
2t
;
(1− x) = dj(qi, qj, pi, pj, t) =
1
2
+
(qj − qi) + (pi − pj)
2t
.
(6)
At stage 2, the principals choose their prices to maximize their objective functions,
taking qualities and wages as given. The public school maximizes the social welfare:
max
pi
πi = (1 + θi) U i + (1 + θj) U j + di pi −
1
2
q2i + dj pj −
1
2
q2j ; (7)
While the private school maximizes its profits:
max
pj
πj = dj pj − ωj + v. (8)
Taking the first order conditions of equations (7) and (8) with respect to pi and pj,
respectively, I obtain the following equilibrium prices:
pi =
(qj − qi)
2
+
1
4
t(2− 3θi − 7θj);
pj = (qj − qi) + t
(
1−
3
2
θj
)
.
(9)
Substituting equilibrium prices into the equations (7) and (8), I obtain an expression for
social welfare and private profits as a function of the levels of quality and wages offered
by the two schools.
At stage 1, these functions are maximized with respect to ωi, qi and ωj, qj, respectively.
I obtain the optimal levels of quality:
q∗i =
32− 56t+ 19θi − 44tθi + 13θj − 36tθj
8(3− 4t)
;
q∗j =
32− 16t+ 19θi + 12tθi + 13θj + 20tθj
8(3− 4t)
,
(10)
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with wages:
ω∗i =
1
2
(
32− 56t+ θi(19− 44t) + θj(13− 36t)
8(3− 4t)
)2
+
−θi
(
64− 184t+ 56t2 + θi(38− 103t− 36t
2) + θj(26− 33t− 108t
2)
16(3− 4t)
)
;
ω∗j =
1
2
(
32− 16t+ θi(19 + 12t) + θj(13 + 20t)
8(3− 4t)
)2
+
−θj
(
64− 176t+ 72t2 + θi(38− 93t− 12t
2) + θj(26− 11t− 100t
2)
16(3− 4t)
)
.
(11)
The chosen prices at stage 2 are equal to:
p∗i =
t(16− 8t+ 5θi + 12tθi − 7θj + 28tθj)
4(3− 4t)
;
p∗j =
t(16− 8t+ 14θi + 5θj + 12tθj)
2(3− 4t)
.
(12)
At stage 3 the demands are equal to
d∗i =
8− 24t− 5θi − 12tθi − 11θj − 4tθj
8(3− 4t)
;
d∗j =
16− 8t+ 5θi + 12tθ1 + 11θj + 4tθj
8(3− 4t)
,
(13)
and the outcomes obtained by the schools are realized:
πi = (1 + θi) U
∗
i + (1 + θj) U
∗
j + d
∗
i p
∗
i −
1
2
q∗2i + d
∗
j p
∗
j −
1
2
q∗2j ; (14)
πj = d
∗
j p
∗
j − ω
∗
j + v. (15)
There are only two types of agents: the self-interested teachers with θ = 0 and the
motivated teachers with θ > 0. At stage 1, I characterize the equilibrium for different
degrees of intrinsic motivation and I obtain different payoffs:
 when both teachers are self-interested, i.e. θi = θj = θ = 0 (the equilibrium
outcomes will be denoted by π∗i , π
∗
j , respectively);
 when teachers are homogeneous and motivated, i.e. θi = θj = θ > 0 (the equilibrium
outcomes will be denoted by π∗i , π
∗
j , respectively);
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 when only the teacher i is motivated, i.e. θi = θ > 0 and θj = θ = 0 (the equilibrium
outcomes will be denoted by π̂∗i , π
∗
j , respectively);
 and, finally, when only the agent j is motivated, i.e. θj = θ > 0 and θi = θ = 0 (the
equilibrium outcomes will be denoted by π∗i , π̂
∗
j , respectively).
The characterization of the equilibrium for different degrees of intrinsic motivation are in
the Appendix A.
4 The Type Choice Game
In stage zero, both firms choose simultaneously which type of agent to hire. Given prices,
quantities and wages, the type choice reduces to the following game:
θj θj
θi (π
∗
i , π
∗
j ) (π
∗
i , π̂
∗
j )
θi (π̂
∗
i , π
∗
j ) (π
∗
i , π
∗
j)
Figure 1: The Type-Choice Game
I start considering the case in which there is high competition in the market (t is small).
I compare the benefits obtained by hiring self-interested teachers with those obtained by
hiring a motivated teacher when the rival school hires a selfish agent. Furthermore, I also
compare the benefits obtained by hiring motivated teachers with those obtained by hiring
a non-motivated agent when the rival school hires a motivated agent.
Lemma 1. If t < 0.165, then
 π∗i < π̂
∗
i and π
∗
j < π̂
∗
j ;
 π∗i > π
∗
i and π
∗
j > π
∗
j .
Proof. See Appendix B.
If there is high competition between schools (t is small) and both principals hire
self-interested teachers, a principal finds it profitable to deviate by hiring a motivated
teacher. By doing so, the public principal increases the social welfare and the private
principal obtains a comparative advantage in terms of demand and price. Hence, if a
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principal hires a motivated teacher the best response of the other principal is to hire a
motivated agent as well.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When t < 0.165, the unique Nash equilibrium is the one in which both
schools hire motivated agents.
Proof. See lemma 1.
When the public and the private schools offer similar programs, there is high compe-
tition in the scholastic market. In this case, the public school hires a motivated teacher
because the agent’s intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the social welfare. Then,
the best response of the private school is to follow suit and to hire a motivated teacher
as well. However, I find that the profits obtained by the private school when both teach-
ers are selfish would always be higher than the profits obtained when both teachers are
motivated, i.e. π∗j > π
∗
j . This result is illustrated in the first graph of figure 2. The
blue line represents the profits obtained by the private school when both teachers are
self-interested. While the purple line represents the profits obtained by the private school
when both teachers are motivated. Then, the presence of the public school, and its choice
to hire a motivated teacher, “pushes” the private principal to hire a motivated agent too.
This result is illustrated in the second graph of figure 2. Now, the blue line represents
the profits of the private school by hiring a selfish agent when the public school hires a
motivated agent. While the purple line represents always the profits of the private school
when both teachers are motivated. The purple line π∗j is above the blue line π
∗
j until t
is low enough. Hence, the private school finds it profitable to hire a motivated agent as
well.
Figure 2: Comparison Profits of the Private School.
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Lemma 2. If 0, 165 < t < 0.2, then
 π∗i > π̂
∗
i and π
∗
j < π̂
∗
j .
 π∗i < π
∗
i and π
∗
j > π
∗
j .
Proof. See Appendix B.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When 0, 165 < t < 0.2, the unique Nash equilibrium is the one in which
the public school hires a selfish teacher, while the private school hires a motivated teacher.
Proof. See lemma 2.
As the schools tend to have differentiated educational programs, the students’ utility
is reduced leading to a reduction of the social welfare. In contrast, the higher the degree
of differentiation of the programs offered by the schools, the higher the profits obtained
by the schools. This effect has a positive impact on the social welfare. There is a level
of t for which the increase in the students’ utility due to the higher quality provided by
the motivated teachers is more than offset by the reduction in the profits earned by the
two schools. In this case, the public principal hires the selfish teacher. In contrast, the
private principal obtains a comparative advantage by hiring a motivated agent when the
public principal hires a selfish one.
Lemma 3. If t > 0.2, then
 π∗i > π̂
∗
i and π
∗
j > π̂
∗
j .
 π∗i < π
∗
i and π
∗
j < π
∗
j .
Proof. See Appendix B.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. When t > 0.2, the unique Nash equilibrium is the one in which both
schools hire selfish teachers.
Proof. See lemma 3.
If the schools offer very different educational services, there is less scope for competition
in the market and the teachers’ intrinsic motivation becomes relatively less important.
In that case, both schools obtain higher benefits by hiring self-interested teachers than
by hiring motivated teachers. Then, the students will choose the school with a program
closer to their necessity without considering the teachers’ intrinsic motivation.
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5 Conclusions
In this article, I have shown that the effect of teachers’ intrinsic motivation on schools’
outcome strictly depends on the degree of differentiation of the programs. When the
schools offer very similar programs, they hire motivated teachers in order to attract stu-
dents. In this case, teachers’ motivation plays an important role in the students’ choice
between schools. In contrast, if the schools offer different programs, the teachers’ in-
trinsic motivation becomes relatively less important. In that case, both schools obtain
higher benefits by hiring self-interested teachers than by hiring motivated teachers. The
Nash-equilibrium is the one in which both schools hire selfish teachers.
The next step of this work is to analyze the optimal position of the schools on the
Hotelling line and to study different model of competition. Moreover, a possible extension
of the model is the one in which the price of both schools is regulated or just the one of
the public school.
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A Appendix A
A.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Both Teachers
are Self-Interested
I begin by characterizing the equilibrium when teachers are self-interested, i.e. θi = θj = 0.
At stage 1, the optimal levels of quality and wages are determined.
The quality’s levels are equal to:
q∗i =
(4− 7t)
(3− 4t)
; q∗j =
2(2− t)
(3− 4t)
. (16)
with wages
ω∗i =
1
2
(
(4− 7t)
(3− 4t)
)2
; ω∗j =
1
2
(
2(2− t)
(3− 4t)
)2
. (17)
By hiring selfish individuals, the quality of the educational services is lower in the public
school than in the private school. For this reason, the wage paid to the public teacher has
to be lower than the wage paid to the teacher working in the private school.
The chosen prices at stage 2 are:
p∗i =
2t(2− t)
(3− 4t)
; p∗j =
4t(2− t)
(3− 4t)
. (18)
When the schools offer similar programs (low t) there is more competition in the market
that leads to a low price for both schools. Moreover, with a higher quality offered by the
private school, the private principal sets higher price than the public school, i.e. p∗j > p
∗
i .
And at stage 3, the demands are realized with
d∗i =
(1− 3t)
(3− 4t)
; d∗j =
(2− t)
(3− 4t)
. (19)
The improvement of the quality permits to the private school to “steal” the market to
the public school, i.e. d∗j > d
∗
i > 0.
After some computations, the social welfare and the private school’s profits are ob-
tained:
π∗i =
−16 + 87t− 115t2 + 44t3
2(3− 4t)2
; π∗j =
2(4− 12t+ 9t2 − 2t3)
(3− 4t)2
+ v . (20)
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A.2 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Teachers are Ho-
mogeneous and Motivated
In this subsection, I determine the equilibrium when both teachers are homogeneous and
intrinsically motivated, i.e. θi = θj = θ > 0.
The optimal levels of quality are the following, respectively:
q∗i =
4− 7t+ 4θ − 10tθ
(3− 4t)
; q∗j =
2(2− t+ 2θ + 2tθ)
(3− 4t)
. (21)
The quality of the services offered by the public school is always lower than the quality
offered by the private school, i.e. q∗i < q
∗
j . The teachers’ intrinsic motivation has a posi-
tive impact on the levels of quality offered by the two schools, i.e.
∂q∗
i
∂θ
> 0 and
∂q∗
j
∂θ
> 0.
In addition, the impact of teachers’ intrinsic motivation on the levels of quality is higher
in the public school than the private school if the programs offered by the schools are
similar, i.e.
∂q∗i
∂θ
>
∂q∗j
∂θ
if t < 1
6
= 0.167.
The wages are given by:
ω∗i =
1
2
(
(4− 7t+ 4θ − 10tθ)
(3− 4t)
)2
− θ
(
8− 23t+ 7t2 + 8θ − 17tθ − 18t2θ
2(3− 4t)
)
ω∗j =
1
2
(
2(2− t + 2θ + 2tθ)
(3− 4t)
)2
− θ
(
8− 22t+ 9t2 + 8θ − 13tθ − 14t2θ
2(3− 4t)
) (22)
The teachers’ intrinsic motivation has a countervailing effect on the wages. On the one
hand, the teachers’ intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the wages. This is be-
cause a high θ leads to high levels of quality of the educational services. Then, both
principals pay high wages in the way to cover the cost of effort and to improve quality
performance. On the other hand, teachers’ intrinsic motivation has a negative impact
on the wages. This is because motivated teachers provide a given level of quality even if
they receive a low compensation for that. The overall effect is positive in both schools.9
Furthermore, the effect of the agents’ intrinsic motivation on wages is higher in the private
school than in the public school, i.e.
∂ω∗
j
∂θ
>
∂ω∗i
∂θ
> 0. This is because given that the quality
offered by the private school is higher, the teacher j has to receive a higher compensation
for his work than the teacher i, i.e. ω∗i < ω
∗
j .
9This result does not support the previous literature in which motivation is effective in stimulating
work effort even in absence of monetary rewards (see for example Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b and
Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006).
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Prices are given by:
p∗i =
t(8− 4t− θ + 20tθ)
2(3− 4t)
; p∗j =
t(16− 8t+ 19θ + 12tθ)
2(3− 4t)
. (23)
The price of the public school is lower than the price of the private school, i.e. p∗j > p
∗
i > 0.
Moreover, the impact of the teachers’ intrinsic motivation is different in the two school.
More specifically, the impact of θ on the price of the public school is negative, unless the
programs offered by the schools are very similar, i.e. t < 1
20
. In contrast, the impact of
the teachers’ intrinsic motivation on the price of the private school is positive. A higher
value of θ increases the gap between the levels of quality offered by the schools increasing
the price of the private school and reducing the price of the public one.10
The demand in the public and private school is respectively equal to:
d
∗
i =
1− 3t− θ(1 + t)
(3− 4t)
; d
∗
j =
2− t+ 2θ(1 + t)
(3− 4t)
. (24)
A higher quality offered by the private school leads to an increase of its demand.
And the social welfare and the private school’s profits are realized:
π∗i =
32− 112t+ 113t2 − 20t3 + 64θ − 173tθ + 88t2θ + 80t3θ + 32θ
2
− 88tθ
2
+ 92t2θ
2
+ 16t3θ
2
2(3− 4t)2
+
+
(1 + θ)(16− 45t+ 16t2 + 16θ − 30tθ − 32t2θ)
2(3− 4t)
;
π∗j =
16− 48t+ 36t2 − 8t3 + 8θ + 44tθ − 152t2θ + 64t3θ − 8θ
2
+ 65tθ
2
− 56t2θ
2
− 80t3θ
2
2(3− 4t)2
+ v.
(25)
10This result is due to the fact that the schools maximize different objective functions. In my previous
article (Manna, 2013), I show that if both principals maximize their profits, the effect of θ on the
prices is negative. Motivation has a positive impact on the quality offered by the firms. It implicitly
reduces the product differentiation between firms stiffening competition and reducing prices. With higher
qualities, the degree of differentiation of the product becomes relatively less important, leading to fiercer
competition.
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A.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Only the Public
Teacher i is Motivated
Now, suppose that only the agent i is intrinsically motivated, i.e. θi = θ and θj = 0.
At stage 1, agents exert effort and the optimal levels of quality are determined:
q̂∗i =
32− 56t+ 19θ − 44tθ
8(3− 4t)
; q∗
j
=
32− 16t+ 19θ + 12tθ
8(3− 4t)
. (26)
Again, the quality of the services offered by the public school is lower than the quality
offered by the private school, i.e. q̂∗i < q
∗
j
. In addition, the intrinsic motivation of the
teacher hiring by the public school has a positive impact on the levels of quality offered
by the two schools, i.e.
∂q̂∗i
∂θ
> 0 and
∂q∗
j
∂θ
> 0. This is due to the fact that an increase of
the level of quality offered by the school i “pushes” the principal j to elicit higher agent
effort in order to improve quality.11
The principals pay the following wages to their agents:
ω̂∗i =
1
2
(
32− 56t+ 19θ − 44tθ
8(3− 4t)
)2
− θ
(
64− 184t+ 56t2 + 38θ − 103tθ − 36t2θ
16(3− 4t)
)
;
ω∗j =
1
2
(
32− 16t+ 19θ + 12tθ
8(3− 4t)
)2
.
(27)
To maintain the comparative advantage in terms of quality, the principal j provides more
incentives. The private school produces higher levels of quality and provides stronger
incentives, i.e. ω̂∗i < ω
∗
j .
The prices are given by:
p̂∗i =
t(16− 8t+ 5θ + 12tθ)
4(3− 4t)
; p∗
j
=
t(8− 4t+ 7tθ)
(3− 4t)
. (28)
A high agent i’s degree of motivation has a positive effect on the price of both schools. A
high θ produces an improvement of the quality offered by both schools, which increases
its price. This effect has a positive impact on the marginal profits obtained by the private
school and a negative impact on the students’ utility.
The demands will be equal to:
d̂∗i =
8− 24t− 5θ − 12tθ
8(3− 4t)
; d∗j =
16− 8t+ 5θ + 12tθ
8(3− 4t)
. (29)
11If the two schools maximized the same objective functions, I would have obtained that the school i
has a comparative advantage with respect to the private school.
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The private school j gains a quality comparative advantage over the public school, and
obtains the “business stealing effect”: an increase of quality permits to “steal” the market
share to the rival firm. This effect has a positive impact on the marginal profits obtained
by the private school j.
At stage 3, the benefits obtained by the schools are realized:
π̂∗i =
−512 + 2784t− 3680t2 + 1408t3
64(3− 4t)2
+
+
−464θ + 3272tθ − 3712t2θ + 896t3θ − 95θ
2
+ 1006tθ
2
− 608t2θ
2
− 288t3θ
2
64(3− 4t)2
;
π∗j =
1024− 3072t+ 2304t2 − 512t3
128(3− 4t)2
+
+
1216θ − 2272tθ − 704t2θ + 768t3θ + 361θ
2
− 104tθ
2
− 1200t2θ
2
128(3− 4t)2
+ v .
(30)
Even if only the agent i is motivated, the private school maintain his comparative
advantage in terms of quality.
A.4 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Only the Private
Teacher j is Motivated
Finally, when only the agent j is intrinsically motivated, i.e. θi = θ = 0 and θj = θj > 0,
agents exert effort and the following levels of quality are determined:
q∗
i
=
32− 56t+ 13θ − 36tθ
8(3− 4t)
; q̂∗j =
32− 16t+ 13θ + 20tθ
8(3− 4t)
. (31)
The quality of the services offered by the public school is lower than the quality offered
by the private school, i.e. q∗
i
< q̂∗j . In addition, the intrinsic motivation of the teacher
hiring by the public school has a positive impact on the levels of quality offered by the
two schools, i.e.
∂q∗
i
∂θ
> 0 and
∂q̂∗
j
∂θ
> 0. In addition, this impact of θ on the levels of quality
is higher in the private school than in the public one.
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The principals pay the following wages to their agents:
ω∗i =
1
2
(
32− 56t+ 13θ − 36tθ
8(3− 4t)
)2
;
ω̂∗j =
1
2
(
32− 16t+ 13θ + 20tθ
8(3− 4t)
)2
− θ
(
64− 176t+ 72t2 + 26θ − 11tθ − 100t2θ
16(3− 4t)
)
.
(32)
In this case, the agents’ intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the wage given to
the unmotivated teacher i. In contrast, the impact of θ on the wage of the motivated
teacher j depends on the value of t and θ. Furthermore, the wage of the public teacher
can be higher than the wage of the private teacher if t < 0.25. If there is competition
in the scholastic market, the public principal has to pay a high wage to the unmotivated
teacher i to produce a larger output. The motivated teacher j provides a given level of
effort even if he receives a low compensation for that.
The prices are given by:
p∗
i
=
t(16− 8t+ 7θ − 28tθ)
4(3− 4t)
; p̂∗j =
t(16− 8t+ 5θ − 12tθ)
2(3− 4t)
. (33)
A high agent i’s degree of motivation has a positive effect on the price of the private
school. A high θ produces an improvement of the quality offered by the private school,
which increases its price. This effect has a positive impact on the marginal profits ob-
tained by the private school and a negative impact on the students’ utility. Regarding the
public school, the impact of θ on its price is positive if t < 0.25. In this case, the public
teacher receives a higher wage than the private teacher and the public principal has to
increase the price to repay his agent.
The demands will be equal to:
d∗i =
(8− 24t− 11θ − 4tθ)
8(3− 4t)
; d̂∗j =
(16− 8t+ 11θ + 4tθ)
8(3− 4t)
. (34)
The private school j gains a quality comparative advantage over the public school, and
obtains the “business stealing effect”: an increase of quality permits to “steal” the market
share to the rival firm. This effect has a positive impact on the marginal profits obtained
by the private school j.
At stage 3, the social welfare and the private school’s profits are, respectively, equal
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to:
π∗i =
−512 + 2784t− 3680t2 + 1408t3
64(3− 4t)2
+
+
−560θ + 2488tθ − 1536t2θ − 384t3θ − 143θ
2
− 34tθ
2
+ 1824t2θ
2
− 1568t3θ
2
64(3− 4t)2)
;
π̂∗j =
1024− 3072t+ 2304t2 − 512t3
128(3− 4t)2
+
+
−704θ + 5088tθ − 9024t2θ + 3328t3θ − 455θ
2
+ 1176tθ
2
+ 1232t2θ
2
− 3584t3θ
2
128(3− 4t)2
+ v .
(35)
B Appendix B
B.1 Proof lemma 1, 2 and 3.
In the first part of these lemmas, I compare the profits when both principals hire self-
interested agents with the one in which only a principal hires a motivated agent.
I start by considering the explicit expression for the public school:
π̂∗i − π
∗
i > 0 if
−464θ + 3272tθ − 3712t2θ + 896t3θ − 95θ
2
+ 1006tθ
2
− 608t2θ
2
− 288t3θ
2
64(3− 4t)2
> 0. (36)
It is not immediate to see for which values of the parameters t and θ the inequality
holds. The proof unfolds in two steps. First, I study the marginal effect of the degree of
differentiation of the educational services t and of the agent’s degree of motivation θ on
the difference between benefits. Secondly, I show that the above inequality holds also in
a limit case and this completes the proof.
I begin by studying the effect of t on the difference in the benefits obtained by the public
school. Differentiating equation (36) with respect to t, I obtain the following:
∂(π̂∗i − π
∗
i )
∂t
< 0. (37)
The degree of differentiation of the educational services t has a countervailing effect on
the social welfare. On the one hand, t has a negative impact on the social welfare due to
a reduction of the students’ utility. When t is high, the market is less competitive. On
the other hand, t has a positive impact on the social welfare due to an increase of the
schools’ profits. The overall effect of t is negative. In addition, this negative impact of t
on the social welfare is higher when only the teacher i is motivated with respect to the
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case both teachers are selfish.
I also analyze the effect of the agent’s intrinsic motivation θ on the differential benefits.
Deriving equation (36) with respect to θ, I obtain the following:
∂(π̂∗i − π
∗
i )
∂θ
> 0 if t < 0.165. (38)
A higher motivation influences positively the social welfare when the public school is the
only one to hire the motivated agent but only if t is small enough. In contrast, it has no
effect on the profits of the firm when both principals hire self-interested agents. Then,
the sign of this derivative is positive for t < 0.165 and negative otherwise.
To consider a limit case, I take the maximum value for t in the interval in which it
affects negatively the differential benefits and a small value for θ, since his impact on the
differential benefits is positive. If inequality (36) holds in this limit case, it will be always
satisfied for other values of these parameters in the interval t ∈ (0; 0.165). I set t = 0.164
and θ = 0.005 and I obtain that π∗i = 0.4214 < 0.4218 = π̂
∗
i .
Now, I consider the explicit expression for the private school:
π̂∗j − π
∗
j > 0 if
−704θ + 5088tθ − 9024t2θ + 3328t3θ − 455θ
2
+ 1176tθ
2
+ 1232t2θ
2
− 3584t3θ
2
128(3− 4t)2
> 0.
(39)
I study the effect of t on the difference in the profits obtained by the private school.
Differentiating equation (39) with respect to t, I obtain the following:
∂(π̂∗j − π
∗
j )
∂t
< 0 (40)
The overall effect of the degree of differentiation of the product on the differential profits
is negative. This is because t has a positive impact on the profits of the firm when both
principals hire self-interested teachers but a negative impact when only a principal hires
a motivated teacher. When t increases the comparative advantage by hiring a motivated
agent is reduced.
I also analyze the marginal effect of the agent’s intrinsic motivation θ on the private
school’s profits. Deriving equation (39) with respect to θ, I obtain the following:
∂(π̂∗j − π
∗
j )
∂θ
> 0 if t < 0.2 (41)
A higher motivation influences positively the profits when the private school is the only
one to hire the motivated agent but only if t is small enough. This is because the private
school obtains a comparative advantage with respect to the rival school in terms of demand
and price. In contrast, it has no effect on the profits of the firm when both principals hire
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self-interested agents. Then, the sign of this derivative is positive for t < 0.2 and negative
in other case.
To consider a limit case, I take the maximum value for t in the interval in which it affects
negatively the differential benefits and a small value of θ, since it impacts positively on the
differential benefits. If inequality (39) holds in this limit case, it will be always satisfied for
other values of these parameters in the interval t ∈ (0; 0.2). I set t = 0.19 and θ = 0.005
and I obtain that π∗j = 0.19 < 0.201 = π̂
∗
j .
If t < 0.165, both schools obtain higher benefits by hiring a motivated agent when
the other school hires a selfish agent. If 0.165 < t < 0.2, only the private school obtains
higher profits by hiring a motivated teacher when the public school hires a selfish one. If
t > 0.2, both schools obtain higher profits by hiring selfish individuals.
I did the same for the second part of the lemmas and I obtained the following results. If
t < 0.165 the best response of both principals is to hire a motivated agent when the other
principal hires a motivated agent. If 0.165 < t < 0.2, only the private school obtains
higher profits by hiring a motivated teacher when the public school hires a motivated one.
When t > 0.2, both schools obtain higher profits by hiring selfish individuals even if the
rival school hires a motivated agent.12
12All the computations and comparison are checked using Mathematica and they are available under
request.
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